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Abstract 
 
In recent years the term “fear of floating” has been used to describe exchange rate regimes that, 
while officially flexible, in practice intervene heavily to avoid sudden or large depreciations. 
However, the data reveals that in most cases (and increasingly so in the 2000s) intervention has 
been aimed at limiting appreciations rather than depreciations, often motivated by the neo-
mercantilist view of a depreciated real exchange rate as protection for domestic industries. As a 
first step to address the broader question of whether this view delivers on its promise, we examine 
whether this “fear of appreciation” has a positive impact on growth performance in developing 
economies. We show that depreciated exchange rates indeed lead to higher growth, but that the 
effect, rather than through import substitution or export booms as argued by the mercantilist 
view, works largely through the deepening of domestic savings and capital accumulation. 
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I. Introduction  
 
In recent years developing countries have increasingly joined the group of economies that 
officially run inflation targeting regimes in the context of freely floating exchange rates. While this 
trend has been heralded as the triumph of floating regimes, many countries are still actively 
pursuing active exchange rate policies. In fact, the trend seems to point this other way. In June 
2003, according to the IMF, 35 countries had fully flexible regimes. By 2008 the number had 
dropped to just 252. Additionally, even with the global financial crisis yet unresolved, international 
reserves in most developing countries have continued growing even when at a historical high, 
while some countries in recent years introduced controls on capital inflows to countervail the 
appreciation of their currencies. Are we re-enacting the fear of floating of the 90s, or is this a new 
breed of active exchange rate policy? If so, are its premises validated in the data? 
To address these questions, we pursue two objectives. First, we examine the evolution of exchange 
rate regimes over the recent period, to identify old and new trends and, more generally, to 
characterize the evolution of exchange rate policy in the 2000s. It  documents the prevalence of a 
fear of appreciation –namely, the tendency to intervene to depreciate (or to postpone the appreciation 
of) the local currency–, a fear of floating in reverse that contradicts the growing consensus built 
around a float cum inflation targeting (FIT) paradigm predicated on the absence of an active 
exchange rate policy. Second, we evaluate the implications of fear of appreciation in terms of 
economic performance –and, in particular, whether the neo-mercantilist rhetoric underscoring this 
policy delivers on its promises in terms of export growth and import substitution– for developing 
economies where the premise of temporary protection to domestic industries applies more 
naturally. We find that fear of appreciation does contribute to growth, but the channel, rather than 
a boost to the tradable sector, appears to lie on the effect of currency undervaluation on savings 
and capital accumulation.  
 
In perspective, the exchange rate debate in developing economies in recent years revolved around 
the interplay of two contrasting features of financial development. First, the fact that financial 
globalization led to a growing ineffectiveness of monetary policy. More precisely, capital controls 
were found to be decreasingly effective as economies became more sophisticated, thus 
                                                 
2 For both dates we exclude countries from the European economic and monetary union.  
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strengthening the restrictions imposed by the impossible trinity –previously circumvented due to the 
absence of de facto financial integration (Rose, 2007) – all of which made floating regimes more 
attractive. Second, the role of (domestic and external) financial dollarization, namely, the foreign 
currency denomination of residents’ assets and liabilities that, to the extent that it introduced 
currency exposures that raised the risk associated with exchange rate jumps, made pegged regimes 
look more attractive.3 Indeed, it was the risk of balance sheet losses to financially dollarized 
governments and firms in the event of a devaluation –stressed in the third generation models of 
currency crises popularized in the context of the Asian crisis– that led to the definition of fear of 
floating (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002), namely, recurrent de facto exchange rate intervention in 
officially floating regimes. 
 
The first aspect of the debate led naturally to the bipolar view (the inherent ineffectiveness and 
instability of conventional exchange rate bands and pegs in the presence of de facto capital 
mobility) that argued that financially integrated economies could either float or hard peg.4 
Combined with the fear of floating view, this approach derived naturally into a “unipolar view” 
according to which hard pegs were the only sensible option for financially dollarized economies: if 
devaluations were contractionary due to balance sheet effects, exchange rate flexibility would only 
amplify the cycle, rather than smooth it out as predicated by the standard theory.5 
 
However, while theory was going one way, policy seemed to head in the opposite direction. By the 
end of the decade, the success in building central bank autonomy and monetary credibility, 
together with the resulting decline in inflation and exchange rate pass-through, led to the growing 
popularity of the flexible pole of the bipolar view as the background for different varieties of 
inflation targeting arrangements that prioritized the inflation rate, rather than the exchange rate, as 
the key nominal anchor. Not surprisingly, among emerging countries, this trend started in 
economies with relatively low levels of financial dollarization (Chile, New Zealand, South Africa, 
Brazil), gradually extending to other countries pari passu with a reduction in their degree of 
dollarization.  In addition, the disappointing Argentine experience with a currency board cast 
doubt on the premises (monetary and fiscal discipline) on which the case for hard pegs had been 
                                                 
3 See Levy Yeyati (2006). 
4 See Eichengreen (1994) and Fischer (2002). 
5 See Frankel (2005) on balance sheet effects and contractionary devaluations, and Calvo (2000) on the unipolar view. 
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predicated.6 Ultimately, the debate in the new millennium appears to have converged to an 
inverted unipolar view, whereby flexible regimes are seen as the only sensible (and durable) choice 
as economies grow financially integrated and sophisticated.7 
 
To evaluate whether this shift towards the flexible pole is actually taking place, in this paper we 
update and extend Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger’s (2005) dataset (LYS) on de facto exchange rate 
regimes. Based on this evidence, we find that the convergence to the FIT paradigm is not taking 
place across the board: the share of non-floats (intermediates, conventional and hard pegs) 
represented 75% of the sample in 2004, exactly the same share as in 2000. 
 
Does that mean that fear of floating has continued to be prevalent despite the favorable context 
and the reduced currency exposure? To get a full answer to that question, it is crucial to note a 
semantic nuance that has been surprisingly understated in the recent exchange rate regime 
literature: fear of floating, as originally defined by Calvo and Reinhart (2002), entails a clearly 
asymmetric exchange rate policy. Since only depreciations trigger fears of financial distress or 
inflation pass-through, under fear of floating the intervention response should be stronger for (if 
not limited to) upward exchange rate movements. More generally, the incentives and implications 
to intervene in order to avoid an appreciation are radically different from those related to avoiding 
a depreciation: where the latter focus on short-run financial crises, the former is usually predicated 
on long-term economic growth. Similarly, the context conducive to one or the other differs: 
whereas fear of floating would tend to arise in times of financial turmoil, fear of appreciation will 
likely be triggered by economic bonanzas. At any rate, treating interventions in a symmetric way –
in particular, attributing any intervention to fear of floating as has been previously the case in the 
literature – may lead to overstate the incidence of financial factors – more so in recent years when 
fear of appreciation appears to have prevailed. 
 
The mercantilist view that exchange rate policy – more precisely, a temporarily undervalued 
currency – could be used to protect infant industries as a development strategy has a long tradition 
in economic theory and have recently enjoyed a minor revival. The issue of undervalued exchange 
rates has received considerable attention as a result of China’s reluctance to float its exchange rate, 
                                                 
6 De la Torre et al. (2002) discusses the Argentine debacle and its implications for the exchange rate debate. 
7 See Levy Yeyati (2005) and references therein. Rose (2007) makes an eloquent case for the new FIT paradigm. 
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a strategy presumed to be aimed at preserving the competitiveness of China’s exports.8 In 
academic circles, the role of depreciated real exchange rates for stimulating growth has been 
discussed in Rodrik (2008), it has also been found important in growth accelerations (Hausmann 
et al., 2005 and Johnson, Ostry and Subramanian, 2006), and has been regarded as an efficient 
development tool (Rodrik, 2006). More recently, the effects of overvaluation have been invoked to 
explain the “dutch desease” effect of foreign aid (Rajan and Subramanian, 2011) or the 
disappointing growth dividends of financial integration (see Prassad, Rajan and Subramanian, 
2007). Despite this indicative evidence, neo-mercantilist views have been saluted, at best, with 
skepticism. 
 
To assess the economic impact of fear of appreciation, we proceed in two steps. First, we refine 
the de facto regime classification to identify two types of foreign exchange interventions: one 
aimed at defending the domestic currency (as in the traditional fear of floating), and one aimed at 
depressing it (as in fear of appreciation). In turn, with this finer classification at hand, we assess the 
economic implications of fear of appreciation. Specifically, we evaluate whether foreign exchange 
interventions geared towards containing a process of appreciation actually help sustain a 
depreciated real exchange rate and, once this fact is established, we study the effect of 
interventions on growth. We find that fear of appreciation lead to faster output and productivity 
growth, which is not restricted to short-term cyclical output changes: we report a significant 
positive effect on the long-run component of GDP growth. However, as opposed to what it is 
usually argued, we find that the effect seems to come not from export-led expansions or import 
substitution, but rather from increased domestic savings and investment rates. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces our extended exchange rate regime 
classification and reports some stylized facts on exchange rate policy in recent years. Section III 
characterizes fear of appreciation and documents its relative importance over time. Section IV 
explores the economic implications of fear of appreciation, identifying links with the real exchange 
rate and economic growth, and examining alternatives channels that could account for the growth 
effect. Section V reviews alternative theoretical explanations for our findings, and concludes. 
 
 
                                                 
8 See Aizenmann and Lee (2007). 
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II. De facto regime classification: Updating  
 
In Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) we introduced a de facto classification of exchange rates 
that relied on clustering country-year observations on the basis of three classifying variables: the 
movements of the nominal exchange rate within each year, the movements in central bank 
reserves (intended to capture interventions in exchange rate markets) and changes in the rate of 
change of the exchange rate (to capture crawling-peg regimes).9 The use of reserve changes 
distinguished our classification from later attempts at classifying exchange rate regimes that relied 
solely on exchange rate volatility,10 and was critical to characterize exchange rate policy – as 
opposed to exchange rate volatility. It was this measure of foreign exchange intervention that 
allowed us to tell whether a stable exchange rate was the result of an active policy aimed at limiting 
exchange rate volatility (as is often assumed), or just the reflection of a stable environment in the 
context of a flexible exchange rate that does not impose any constraint on macroeconomic policy. 
In turn, the direction of the intervention will be the key variable to identify fear of floating from 
fear of appreciation in the finer regime classification that we propose here.  
   
Central Bank interventions are notoriously difficult to measure and they usually differ from a 
simple measure of reserve variation. To approximate as closely as possible the intervention impact 
of changes in reserves, we subtract government deposits at the central bank from the Central 
Bank’s net foreign assets.11 More specifically, we define net reserves in dollars as: 
 
(1)  
j
jjj
j
e
DepositsGovsLiabilitieForeignAssetsForeign
R
... 
 , 
 
                                                 
9 The methodology classifies the country year data by the k-means algorithm, through a two step procedure with five 
groupings. See Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2004a, 2004b, 2005) for further reference. 
10 See, among others, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Shambaugh (2004). 
11 Oil producing countries and countries with important privatization programs are examples of cases where the latter 
correction matters. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) indicate other reasons (hidden foreign exchange transactions, use of 
credit lines, derivative transactions, or issuance of debt in foreign currency) that make it difficult to compute the real 
movement in reserves. To these one could add coordinated intervention by other central banks (though this should be 
limited to G-3 economies) and the measurement error introduced by the fact that all accounts are transformed to 
dollar units. If the Central Bank holds a portfolio of assets with several currencies, changes in the parities between the 
reserve currencies can be mistaken for foreign exchange interventions. We believe this measurement error problem 
should not be significant as most of the reserves are held in dollar-denominated assets. 
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where e indicates the price of a dollar in terms of local currency.12 In turn, our measure of 
intervention for country s and year t is defined as the annual average of the absolute value of 
monthly interventions (months are indexed by j), that is, the average absolute change in net 
international reserves relative to the monetary base in the previous month, both measured in US 
dollar: 
 
(2)   
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
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where the monthly absolute change in reserves is normalized by the monetary aggregate (both 
measured in the same currency) to capture the monetary impact of the intervention.  
  
Using this measure of intervention, together with data on the volatility of exchange rates, we 
updated the LYS dataset to cover the period 1974-2004 and, based on new information, 
completed the classification for a number of undisclosed basket pegs. As a result, the new dataset 
includes 179 countries and 4189 observations, covering 82% of all country-year observations for 
the period.13  
 
We can use the measure in (1) to benchmark actual interventions by type of regime against a 
“typical” intervention under a float, which can be proxied by the distribution of the intervention 
variable R for the Australia, Japan and the US, three countries that are often considered the closest 
to textbook floating regimes (Figure 1).14 As can be seen, while pegs generally exhibit heavier 
intervention than floats, there are still many pegs with limited intervention – relative to the 
benchmark floats – a fact that can reflect the success of pegs in preempting market pressure, or 
the fact that many countries choose to peg only when they do not anticipate that the peg will be 
subject to considerable shocks.  
 
                                                 
12 All variables correspond to the end of period for a specific month. 
13 To our knowledge, the updated LYS regime classification offers the largest country and year coverage over the post-
Bretton Woods period. The data is available online at the authors’ web pages. 
14 The distributions are based on pooled observations of the variable R averaged over the year. 
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Figure 2 shows the distribution of exchange rates over the recent years. The graph shows that 
regime choices remained remarkably stable, particularly since 1990. This evidence looks unkind to 
the bipolar view that forecast the disappearance of intermediate regimes, although it shows a very 
slight increasing trend in floating regimes. Furthermore, as noted in the introduction, de facto 
floats continue to represent less than one fourth of the total sample.15 
 
 
III. Fear of appreciation 
 
As noted in the introduction, the nature of de facto intermediate and pegged regimes involves a 
clear asymmetry. While the prototypic fear of floater would exhibit a low tolerance to exchange 
rate depreciations, there is little in the story to motivate the defense of a depreciated real exchange 
rate through (often unsterilized) reserve accumulation. Grouping both types of interventions 
together when studying the implications of the regime choice is likely to misrepresent either of 
them.  
 
Because the LYS classification is already built on actual interventions, we can identify these two 
types of intervention with only minor additional work. The simplest way to do so is to sort out 
countries according to whether they intervene to depress or to defend the exchange rate, i.e. 
whether the intervention in (2) is positive or negative. We capture this dichotomy in a new 
measure of intervention Int1 defined as the annual average of the monthly interventions: 
 
(3)  
 
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which now will be negative or positive according to whether the central bank is selling or 
purchasing the foreign currency. 
                                                 
15 This broad distribution masks important differences across groups of countries. For example, Latin American 
countries seem to have embraced floating arrangements full-heartedly (mostly in combination with inflation targeting 
regimes), with the amount of floats doubling between 2000 and 2004 at the expense of both intermediate and pegged 
regimes. On the other hand, emerging Asia has preserved its bias toward more rigid arrangements. Interestingly, this 
evidence is a priori at odds with the bipolar view, since currency mismatches in Latin America are large, and certainly 
larger than in Asia.  
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Figure 3 distinguishes among intermediate regimes by indicating the percentage of cases where 
intervention is positive. As the figure shows, the direction of intervention has changed over time 
in a predictably way. The debt crises years found most developing countries selling foreign 
currency to defend their exchange rate anchors, while in recent years (with the unsurprising 
exception of crisis year 1998) countries have increasingly intervened in the opposite direction. As 
it turns out, conventional fear of floating represents today less than 20% of intermediate regimes. 
The same story emerges when interventions are detrended (to factor out the positive intervention 
that may be associated with the long-run growth of output and monetary aggregates), and when 
very small reserves changes are filtered out (with the cutoff defined as the 95% confidence interval 
of the distribution of interventions in benchmark floats Australia, Japan and the US). Results are 
comparable when the exercise is replicated for the joint sample of intermediate and pegged 
regimes. 
 
To what extent can the recent fear of appreciation be attributed to active interventions geared 
towards preventing currency appreciation in the face of capital inflows, as opposed to the 
precautionary motives often debated in the related literature? While currency stability may not be 
the sole argument behind intervention, it is easy to show that it is its key determinant, even after 
controlling for precautionary motives.  
 
Precautionary motives have been proxied by the time proximity to financial crises (Aizenman and 
Lee, 2007), the presence of financial dollarization and currency mismatches (Levy Yeyati, 2008) 
and, more recently, by financial depth (as captured, e.g., by M2 over GDP), under the hypothesis 
that foreign currency liquidity works as a buffer in the event of capital flight much in the same way 
as deposit insurance does for domestic deposits (Obstfeld et al., 2010 and Lane et al., 2010).16 
Here, we follow this recent approach and use as dependent variable the intervention measure. 
Additional controls include the financial account balance, the trade balance and the change in 
terms of trade. We add year dummies to control for common global factors (e.g., dollar weakness 
or global risk appetite) that may temporarily influence the balance of payments in the emerging 
                                                 
16 Precautionary reserves are often connected to a “fear of the IMF” (namely, the need to accumulate hard currency 
liquidity to avoid resorting to the Fund in the event of a shortage), which is particularly strong in emerging economies 
where local constituencies preserve a very negative view of the role of the Fund in the resolution of the financial crises 
of the late 90s and early 2000s. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
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world. We look, alternatively, at two sample periods: 1974-2007 and 1993-2007. The regression 
results support the fear of appreciation view, as indicated by the significantly positive link between 
intervention, on the one hand, and balance of payments inflows on the other (Table 1). The 
results make intuitive sense, as intervention has typically been associated with (and advocated by 
policy makers on) the need to prevent “excessive” appreciation (and has in some cases been 
followed by the threat or imposition of restrictions or taxes on capital inflows).  
 
While reserve accumulation may be largely explained by exchange rate policy, the fact that the 
stock of reserves may also grow with monetary aggregates for precautionary motives may bias our 
tests of the economic implications of intervention, inasmuch as increases in output tend to induce 
increases in money demand that, in turn, may be met by increases in precautionary international 
reserves.17 To the extent that our intervention measure confounds this growth-induced 
precautionary increase in reserves with exchange rate interventions, it may be biased by 
endogeneity problems. 
 
To address this potential concern, we adopt a conservative strategy: we modify our intervention 
measure to filter out the effect of changes in money demand. Specifically, we define first the ratio 
of reserves to broad money (M2):18  
 
(4)  
j
jjj
j
M
DepositsGovsLiabilitieForeignAssetsForeign
R
2
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2

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and then we compute a new intervention measure, Int2, as the annual average change of this ratio: 
(5)    


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1
1,,,,, 222
j
jtsjtsts RRInt   
Notice that a positive Int2 implies a strong degree of intervention, because for intervention to be 
positive reserve accumulation must exceed the increase in monetary aggregates. Thus, positive 
values of this “strong intervention” measure cannot be interpreted as a response to an increase in 
                                                 
17 Alternatively, under a flexible exchange rate regime without a precautionary motive, the increase in money demand 
would be met by money supply with no change in the stock of reserves. 
18 Alternative estimations using the ratio to base money provide the same results and are available upon request. 
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money demand. For robustness, in the empirical tests that follow we use both intervention 
measures. 
 
 
IV. Economic implications 
 
Having shown that fear of appreciation has been the prevailing pattern in recent years among 
countries with an active exchange rate policy; the next step is to understand the implications of 
this choice and to examine whether the priors often cited in the related literature are empirically 
validated. In particular, it is worth exploring whether these interventions have a significant and 
lasting effect on real variables despite the traditional view that nominal interventions are unlikely 
to have a real economic impact.19  
 
a. Does intervention depreciate the real exchange rate? 
 
The first critical link to be explored empirically is the one between intervention and real 
appreciations, that is, whether interventions indeed manage to preserve a depreciated real 
exchange rate. To that end, we run a panel regression of the real exchange rate on key 
determinants of the exchange rate: terms of trade, the output of trading partners, and capital 
inflows.20 All regressions include year dummies to control for global factors such as international 
liquidity or risk appetite, as well as country fixed effects. Finally, we include estimates for 2- and 3-
year non-overlapping intervals to test for cumulative effects. Our sample, here as well as in the 
following tests, comprises all developing economies. 
 
Our benchmark specification is given by: 
 
(6)  ys,t =  Int js,t  + ’ X s,t + t + s + s,t , 
 
                                                 
19 All tests are conducted for the post-Bretton Woods period prior to the 2008 global crisis. 
20 We choose the bilateral over the multilateral exchange rate for these tests because it is the one typically targeted by 
intervention. However, comparable results are obtained using the IMF’s real effective exchange rates are comparable. 
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where y is the log of the real exchange rate, X is a vector of controls including the log difference of 
the terms of trade, the log difference of the trade-weighted average of the GDP of the country’s 
trading partners, and the ratio of the financial account over GDP (to measure capital inflows), and 
t, s , s,t are, respectively, the year and country dummies and the error term.  
 
Exchange rates and reserves tend to change dramatically and endogenously over periods of 
financial distress that may lead to strong positive correlations (for example, a reserve drain 
followed by a currency collapse) that could be misleadingly construed as a policy choice. To make 
sure that these extreme events do not contaminate our results, all our regressions exclude extreme 
values of the intervention measure and the dependent variable.21  
 
Table 2 shows our results. We find the expected positive effect of intervention on the real 
exchange rate: the contemporaneous effect is positive and significant. The results indicate that a 
10% increase in the reserves-to-broad money ratio leads to a contemporaneous 1.16% increase in 
the real exchange rate and that the effect almost doubles if intervention is sustained over two 
years. The estimated effect is smaller (but still significant) for Int1. Moreover, the effect declines 
(and ceases to be significant) beyond the second year, but does not revert. 
 
A similar exercise can be conducted for a Balassa Samuelson-based undervaluation proxy. We 
follow Rodrik (2008) to constructs such a proxy by computing an index of overvaluation in three 
steps. First, we use data on exchange rates (XRAT) and PPP conversion factors (PPP) from Penn 
World Tables 6.3 (Aten, Heston, and Summers, 2009) to calculate a “real” exchange rate (RER) 
defined as: 







it
it
it
PPP
XRAT
RER lnln , 
where i is an index for countries and t is an index for the time period. XRAT and PPP are 
expressed as national currency units per U.S. dollar. When RER is greater than one it indicates that 
the value of the currency is lower (more depreciated) than is indicated by purchasing-power parity. 
                                                 
21 Specifically, we include values of Int1 between -150% and 150%, and values of Int2 between -100% and 100%. 
Similarly, we restrict our sample to values inside a 4-standard deviation interval around the mean of all dependent 
variables. Including outliers, however, does not affect the sign of significance of the results. 
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So the second step is to account for the Balassa-Samuelson effect (the fact that non-traded goods 
are cheaper in poorer countries) by regressing RER on per-capita GDP (RGDPCH):22 
itt
USt
it
it uf
RGDPCH
RGDPCH
RER 
ln
ln
ln   (1) 
where tf  is a fixed effect for time period and uit is the error term. This regression yields an 
estimated  = -0.247 (with a very high absolute value of the t-statistic around 43).  
Finally, to arrive at his index of undervaluation the difference between the actual real 
exchange rate and the Balassa-Samuelson-adjusted rate is taken: 
ititit RERRERUNDERVAL ˆlnlnln  , 
where itRER ˆln  is the predicted values from equation (1). Defined in this way, UNDERVAL is 
comparable across countries and over time. Whenever UNDERVAL exceeds unity, it indicates 
that the exchange rate is set such that goods produced at home are cheap in dollar terms: the 
currency is undervalued. When UNDERVAL is below unity, the currency is overvalued. (In what 
follows we also follow Rodrik in using its logarithmic transform). Table 3 reports the results, 
which replicates closely those in Table 2.  
 
It is important to note at this point that reverse causality should not be a concern here: since 
positive interventions are likely to be triggered by real appreciations, endogeneity, if anything, 
would offset the positive correlation found in the table. Similarly, to the extent that mercantilist 
interventions occur when potentially unobservable “good things happen”, it is unlikely that 
omitted variables can account for the observed positive coefficient: on the contrary, uncontrolled 
favorable external factors would tend to weaken the positive association between intervention and 
the real exchange rate.  
 
To complete the characterization of fear of appreciation, standard economic theory provides 
another natural testable implication: intervention to prevent a downward exchange rate adjustment 
                                                 
22 Here, we depart slightly from Rodrik’s results by using per capita GDP relative to the US (rather than per capita 
GDP), as the exchange rate is measured relative to that country. We found this not to alter the results in any 
significant way. 
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should derive, in the absence of price controls, in inflationary pressures, as the system countervails 
the effects of intervention to move the exchange rate gradually towards its equilibrium level. 
Table 4 shows this by estimating a standard log differenced money demand equation (including 
the lagged dependent variable to control for inertial inflation), where intervention variables are 
added as additional controls. The data shows that, while intervention is not significantly correlated 
with inflation, it is associated with price increases when the latter is measured on the change in the 
implicit GDP deflator, which is fully in line with the expected increase in the price of tradables 
relative to non-tradables due to foreign exchange intervention.23 This is confirmed in columns 5 
and 6, and again –for tree-years averages– in columns 7 and 8, where we find that the ratio of the 
GDP deflator over the CPI is positively related to foreign exchange intervention.24  
 
In sum, we can preliminary conclude that both measures of intervention (particularly the second 
one involving an increase in the international reserves backing of monetary aggregates) are 
associated with a contemporaneous increase in the real exchange rate, driven by an increase in the 
price of tradables relative to the consumer consumption basket. 
 
b. Does intervention foster output and productivity growth? 
 
Does fear of appreciation have any influence on economic activity? If so, is it related with short-
lived and quickly reverted cyclical fluctuations, or does it contribute to long-lasting output 
expansions? To explore this issues empirically, we face two methodological problems. On the one 
hand, there is the already noted positive link between the growth of output and monetary 
aggregates, which we address here introducing a second intervention variable (Int2) that traces 
reserve accumulation in excess of monetary expansions.25 On the other hand, there is the 
possibility that interventions and growth respond to common factors. Favorable conditions (both 
domestic and external) are expected to lead both to faster growth and stronger demand for 
                                                 
23 The rather weak impact on CPI inflation may reflect the fact that, at least in recent years, intervention has been 
mostly sterilized.  
24 The tradable component of the GDP is typically larger than that of the consumption basket. Note that, if real wages 
are kept constant, this difference should translate into an increase in the retribution to capital relative to labor, a point 
to which we come back in the next section. 
25 While in principle there seems to be no reason why the ratio or reserves over broad money (Int2) should increase 
during economic booms, an argument can be made that in the presence of mean reversing real exchange rate swings, a 
currency mismatched country should prevent appreciation for fear of an ulterior depreciation (Levy Yeyati, 2005). See 
Caballero and Lorenzoni (2006) for an analytical model along these lines. 
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domestic assets, creating appreciation pressures. Moreover, growth itself can stimulate capital 
inflows that add to the appreciation bias. In both cases, fear of appreciation may lead the monetary 
authorities to intervene, inducing a positive association between intervention and economic 
performance that may be incorrectly interpreted as the result of a positive growth effect of 
intervention.  
 
Our additional controls (terms of trade, external demand shocks, and capital inflows) should help 
alleviate this potential problem. We also control for initial wealth (proxied by the initial per capita 
GDP) and population growth. As before, we include country dummies, and year dummies to 
capture the effect of global factors such as international liquidity or risk appetite. 
 
One potential caveat of the present analysis is the possibility that an association between 
intervention (that is, growing reserves) and growth captures the recovery that typically follows a 
financial crisis or, conversely, a protracted output contraction after a boom. While extreme events 
are already excluded from the regression, the results may nonetheless capture the aftermath of the 
crisis. To make sure that this is not the case, we add the initial output gap (computed as the HP-
cyclical component of output) as an additional control.26 
 
Table 5 reports the results. The intervention effect appears to be consistently significant and 
economically important. Column (1)-(4) tells us that a 10% intervention is associated with roughly 
a 0.11% increase in the growth rate in the following year. As expected, for the stronger Int2, the 
associated increase is 0.2%. The results are consistent when estimated over three-year averages. 
Are these results the reflection of a crisis, that is, an economic downturn at a time when reserves 
are falling? Columns (2) and (4) dispel this concern: it is not negative intervention (a defensive sale 
of reserves by central banks under attack) that is driving the results. On the contrary, negative 
interventions have no additional impact on output growth; if anything, they exert (as in the 
specification of column 4) no significant impact on economic activity. 
 
                                                 
26 We also tested an alternative measure of past output drops, namely, the current depth of the recession that 
measures the vertical distance to the previous local GDP maximum. Results were virtually unchanged and are omitted 
for brevity. 
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Similar results are obtained when we substitute labor productivity (measured as real GDP per 
worker) for real growth in the previous specification. Table 6 reproduces the specification of 
Table 5 with the new dependent variable. The findings are more mixed. This is not unexpected: 
while it is not unlikely that a one year intervention may in itself trigger a growth process, 
interventions may have a higher chance to elicit productivity gains only over time.  
 
The previous results are subject to (at least) two potential criticisms. The first one is related to the 
fact that, by working with short one- and three-year windows, our findings may be the reflection 
of short-lived cyclical effects on GDP. Moreover, if intervention is induced by economic 
expansions driven by domestic real shocks not captured by the additional controls, the positive 
intervention-growth link may be in part reflecting a reverse causality not fully eliminated by the 
lagging of the independent variables. On a more conceptual ground, the mercantilist view is based 
on the infant-industry premise that temporary protection leads to permanent effects in terms of 
competitiveness. More generally, the case for active exchange rate policy is certainly stronger if the 
effects of temporary intervention prove to be persistent. 
  
A straightforward way of testing for this is to examine the effect of intervention on the trend and 
cycle components of GDP separately. We do that in Table 7, where we re-run the baseline 
specification of Table 5 for output cycle and trend, respectively, where the latter are constructed, 
alternatively, using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter and the Baxter-King’s (BK) band-pass 
procedure, and add the first three lags if the intervention variable.  The main result, which do not 
diverge qualitatively across methodologies, show a positive and significant effect on the long-run 
component (the effect on the cyclical component is significant only for the first intervention 
variable). The number, again, indicates sizeable economic effects: based on the BK decomposition, 
a 10% increase in Int1 and Int2 leads, respectively, to cumulative 0.22% and 0.46% increases in 
long-run growth over four years. All things considered, the evidence suggests a robust, persistent 
and economically important effect of intervention on economic growth. 
 
The previous statement, however, should be taken with a grain of salt. While growth regressions 
have been standard in the macroeconomic literature due to their ability to exploit large cross-
country datasets amenable to statistical testing, they often raise concerns regarding the robustness 
of the results, among other reasons because of the combination of potential simultaneity and 
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endogeneity problems and the fact that it is virtually impossible to find credibly exogenous 
variables to instrument the relevant controls –almost any time-varying macroeconomic variables 
have been found to be correlated with growth in the prolific growth literature.27  
 
The fact that the link between intervention and growth identified here still holds over three-year 
periods and for long-run output trends should help dispel part of the natural skepticism associated 
with growth regressions. This notwithstanding, in order for the argument to be convincing, it 
needs to provide a clear empirical characterization of the channel through which this link 
materializes. Hence, the second criticism mentioned above, to which we turn next. 
 
IV. Intervention and growth: The channel 
 
If we accept for a moment the implication of the previous findings, namely, that there is indeed an 
effect of exchange rate intervention on growth, where does this effect come from? Is it by 
promoting import substitution and stimulating the production and export of more sophisticated 
manufactures previously overpriced relative to international competitors, as the mercantilist view 
predicates? Does it induce a shift in the production structure that moves the economy to high 
productivity growth tradable sectors? This is certainly the prime suspect in this case, and the one 
we examine first in this section.  
 
To do so, we start by looking at the export-import effects, both as a share of GDP, and in terms 
of their real growth rates. Export and import shares are often used in the literature to measure the 
impact of the exchange rates on trade. However, they suffer from an important drawback in this 
context because they are bound to reflect changes in the relative price of tradables. In particular, 
the shares should increase with a real devaluation, thus delivering almost by definition a positive 
relation between depreciation and their participation in output even if the former has no effect on 
traded volumes. It is more accurate to look at the growth volume of exports and imports. 
 
We present the two sets of regressions in Table 8. The specifications are similar to those in Table 
5. In addition, the growth of trade volumes is conditioned on GDP growth to filter the influence 
                                                 
27 See Rodrik (2005).  
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of economic activity on trade.28 The results are rather disappointing: not only is the volume of 
exports virtually unaltered; the contemporaneous effect, as measured over three-year windows, 
turns out to be significantly negative. On the other hand, imports are positively correlated with 
intervention, again at odds with the import substitution premise of the mercantilist view.29  
 
Intervention may exert its benign influence on the quality rather than the quantity of exports. 
Absent a good proxy for export quality, a second best alternative often used to assess export 
sophistication is its degree of concentration. However, this avenue does not provide positive 
results either: export diversification (as measured by a Herfindahl index of exports revenues) 
appears to be unaffected by intervention (columns 15 and 16). 
 
This negative result on the trade front eliminates one of the key channels through which a 
depreciation may influence output: export-led expansions. If it is not an export boom what 
triggers an increase in output, how can we explain the finding that interventions stimulate growth?  
 
Table 9 points at one alternative explanation. Here we look at the link between interventions, on 
the one hand, and savings and investment rates, on the other. Importantly, saving rates are 
computed at current prices, whereas investment ratios are at constant prices (to avoid capturing 
the valuation effect of the real appreciation on imported investment goods, typical in many 
developing economies). The results are now significant and unambiguous. The savings ratio 
increases contemporaneously about 1.9 percentage points if the reserves-to-M2 ratio doubles 
(column 2); as can be seen, the result is not driven by external or internal bonanzas, which are 
captured by the additional controls in the regression. In turn, the investment ratio grows, with a 
predictable lag, by 2.4 percentage points (column 4), and interventions remain significant even 
after controlling for the contemporaneous increase in savings (columns 5 and 6). 
 
The savings channel highlighted in the previous results has not gone unnoticed in the literature. As 
early as 1965, Diaz Alejandro suggested that a devaluation may generate important income 
                                                 
28 Note that the mercantilist view presumes that intervention affects trade volumes directly and, in turn, trade has a 
positive influence on growth. If that is not the case, intervention may still affect trade through its effect on growth, 
but that will not identify the intervention-growth channel that we are after. 
29 Thus, any direct impact of intervention on trade ratios would be entirely driven by the relative price change due to 
the real depreciation of the currency. 
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distribution effects, shifting resources from workers to firms or agricultural producers. Yet, Diaz 
Alejandro believed such changes to be contractionary, due to the negative income effect on 
consumers and the associated slump in domestic absorption.30 A “modern” view, in turn, would 
stress the contractionary effect of balance sheet effects in the presence of financial dollarization. 
Firms with foreign currency denominated liabilities will find themselves increasingly cash-
constrained following a sharp devaluation, triggering a potentially large fall in investment.31 
 
A consistent story for our findings could be built, however, by combining Díaz Alejandro’s story 
with the presence of financial constraints. To the extent that a real devaluation reduces labor costs, 
it contributes internal funds to financially constrained firms, thereby fostering savings and 
investment. Alternatively, in a financially constrained economy, the implicit transfer from low-
income, low-saving propensity workers to high income capitalists should boost overall savings, 
lowering the cost of capital to the same effect.32 Unlike in the original story, in this version the real 
devaluation should be expansionary because it relaxes the borrowing constraints that bind the 
firms (in the first case) of the economy (in the second).  
 
Why isn’t this benign effect on financial constraints outweighed by the adverse balance sheet 
effect? Presumably, the policy decision to keep the currency undervalued is not independent of the 
financial dollarization: fear of appreciation is likely to arise in countries where balance sheet effects 
are small or inexistent. At any rate, the hypothesis that fear of appreciation induces a redistribution 
towards financially constrained firms relies on the premise that interventions – and, in turn, 
devaluations – entail a transfer of income from labor to capital (or, more precisely, an increase in 
the profitability of capital at the expense of labor income). We should examine, then, whether this 
intervention-induced redistributions actually materialize in practice. 
 
We do this in two ways. First, we look directly at the effects of intervention on the ratio of labor 
over capital income (Table 10) –an exercise that, to our knowledge, was last done in this context 
by Edwards (1989). We first run the specification in Table 5, which controls for population 
                                                 
30 In fact, his work led to a long debate on whether devaluations were contractionary of expansionary, long before 
financial dollarization introduced an additional –and often dominating– ingredient in the equation. 
31 This is the channel popularized by the sudden stop literature (Krugman, 1999; Chang and Velasco, 2001) that led to 
the unipolar view of exchange rate policy. 
32  The first channel is more likely to apply to small and medium enterprises with limited access to finance; the second, 
to large companies that fund their investments in capital markets. 
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growth, and external factors (terms of trade shocks, external demand shocks and capital inflows). 
Since a lower labor income ratio may signal a higher productivity of capital, we add lagged 
productivity growth as an additional control (which comes up with the expected negative sign). 
The results are encouraging. We find that a 10% intervention leads to a 0.5% decline in the labor 
share when intervention is measured by Int1, and to a 2.4 % decline when it is measured by Int2. 
 
A second way to test the premise of the redistribution story is through the effect of interventions 
on the labor market, more specifically, its incidence on unemployment (Table 11). Either when we 
include our set of external indicators in columns 1 and 3, or when we control for the effect of 
current output growth (which has the expected negative coefficient) in columns 2 and 4, 
interventions exhibit a significantly negative effect on unemployment. The fact that the 
redistribution from labor to capital indeed happens at a time of declining unemployment further 
supports the view that the effect of fear appreciation on real variables, at least in the medium run 
captured by the previous tests, is mainly driven by a decline in real wages. 
 
Note that these results are in line with our findings in Table 4. To the extent that intervention 
induces inflationary pressures, less than perfect wage indexation should result in lower real wages. 
However, this is not necessary to explain the redistribution effect reported in Table 10: inasmuch 
as the higher relative price of tradables is not fully passed through to the CPI (as our results in 
Table 4 indicate), capital income should increase relative to labor income even if wages are kept 
constant in terms of the local CPI. Indeed, the higher return from exports due to the undervalued 
currency may boost employment and real wages at the same time – particularly in the case of 
commodity producers with a low component of imported capital where the countervailing effect 
of a high exchange rate on the cost of imports is only minor.33 
 
V. Discussion: Evidence in search of a theory 
 
Our findings provide an interesting vantage point from which we can revisit the link between 
nominal and real variables and, in particular, the several hypotheses that have been suggested by 
the literature regarding the role of exchange rates as a development strategy. While in principle our 
                                                 
33 Note that the same argument applies to countries where capital and infrastructure investment has been made at the 
previous lower exchange rate, or is curently subsidized (or regulated) by the government. 
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results are consistent with the claim that undervalued exchange rates foster growth, they cast 
doubts on the channel of import substitution cum export stimulus often highlighted by its 
advocates. Instead, our tests suggest that the mechanism is associated with an increase in aggregate 
savings and investment, and a decline in labor income relative to capital compensation. 
 
This preliminary evidence seems to assign a more limited role for the recent incarnations of 
export-led strategies such as self discovery (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2005). The presumed benign 
influence of mercantilist interventions on export growth and diversification appears not to be 
there, although the consequences in terms of their potential to foster growth by improving the 
quality of the export mix (Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik, 2007) remain to be tested. Moreover, 
our results seem at odds with previous findings on the effects of overvaluation on the tradable 
sector by Rajan and Subramanian (2011). However, it is conceivable that those results simply 
reflect the effect of the relative price change on the output of sectors with varying degrees of 
exportability.34 By contrast, the findings, reported in the same paper, that an undervalued currency 
fosters growth in labor intensive sectors is fully in line with the negative correlations between fear 
of appreciation and labor compensation documented here. 
 
Our empirical results point at two possible alternative channels through which devaluations may 
contribute to growth. The first one is a labor market enhancing effect reminiscent of the channels 
identified in classical models of economies with unlimited supply of labor (Lewis, 1958, Fei and 
Ranis, 1961). In those models, the development challenge was to move workers from 
unproductive subsistence agricultural jobs into high productivity industrial jobs. While a 
depreciated exchange rate may be a plausible vehicle to entice firms to hire this surplus labor, the 
quantitative effects that we find are relatively minor (a 10% increase in the reserve-to-M2 ratio 
decreases unemployment rate in 0.15 percentage points).  
 
A second, alternative channel relates to the benign effect of lower labor costs on access to internal 
funds by financially constrained enterprises, an aspect that has been highlighted as a source of the 
rapid recovery in the aftermath of recent emerging market crises (Calvo and Talvi, 2006) and, 
                                                 
34 The paper looks at the nominal value added by sector, deflated by a GDP implicit price level. As a result, a real 
devaluation should reflect positively in the valued added of exportable industries that benefit from higher prices, even 
if produced quantities remain constant or even decline. 
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more generally, as a source of growth in developing economies (Aghion et al. 2009).35 This channel 
should be particularly relevant for low and middle income economies where financial constraints 
are more prevalent. Interestingly, the same authors have also flagged, elsewhere, the deleterious 
effects of a devaluation on firms with foreign-currency liabilities (Calvo et al., 2006; Aghion et al., 
2004). Two factors help reconcile these two seemingly contradictory claims. The first one has 
already been noted: the degree of financial dollarization or, more precisely, its gradual decline in 
the developing world.36 The second factor relates to the fact that fear of appreciation, as measured 
here, captures voluntary interventions to bring down the exchange rate, rather than the involuntary 
depreciations that occur in period of financial stress despite defensive exchange rate intervention, 
which underlie the predictions of the traditional fear of floating literature.  
 
How can we reconcile the earlier and modern versions of the redistribution argument? In 
particular, how does the income transfer from labor to capital that was contractionary in the earlier 
version (Díaz Alejandro, 1965) become expansionary here? The previous discussion offers a 
possible explanation. Diaz Alejandro’s view, embedded in a Keynesian framework, revolved 
around the question of how the income that was transferred from workers to capitalists was 
ultimately spent. Because Diaz Alejandro was thinking on an agricultural society (his 1965 piece 
was inspired by the Argentine economy), he did not see these increased savings translating into 
sources of domestic finance but rather going abroad in the form of foreign assets; hence, the 
depressed aggregate demand that explained the drop in output. Our findings suggest that the funds 
that in the earlier version were spent abroad may in fact be allocated domestically to productive 
investment previously postponed due to insufficient financing.  
 
A final aspect that deserves to be noted relates to the connection between fear of appreciation and 
global imbalances. While they are certainly related (as exchange rate policy incides both on the 
current account surpluses of global lenders and on the allocation of these surpluses to reserve 
currency assets) causality is less clear: Is exchange rate intervention in emerging economies a 
                                                 
35 In Aghion et al (2009), rather than a source of finance, internal funds are a vehicle that domestic financial markets 
use to collateralize a joint projects with foreign direct investors carrying state-of-the-art technology. 
36 Financial dollarization is possibly the sole aspect that may turn the exchange rate from a countercyclical shock 
absorber into a procyclical source of economic contractions (see Frankel, 2005; and Levy Yeyati, 2006). Given that the 
pro-growth consequences of fear of appreciation are more likely to materialize in the absence of the severe currency 
mismatches usually found in financially dollarized economies, it is not surprising that its popularity has grown in 
recent years pari passu with a gradual dedollarization of financial markets in developing countries in the 2000s.  
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deliberate policy choice that ultimately fosters global imbalances as the US authorities have often 
argued, or simply the reflection of external surpluses and capital inflows that are, in turn, the 
passive reflection of external developments (favorable terms of trade and productivity shocks in 
the developing world; domestic imbalances and expansionary policies in the advanced world) as 
emerging economies typically claim?37 While the consensus view seems to point at a two-way 
causality,38 for the purpose of our analysis an increase in reserves associated with a balance of 
payments surplus can only defined as active market intervention –in contrast with, for instance, 
advanced commodity exporting countries like Australia or New Zealand that witnessed the real 
appreciation of their currencies in the 2000s without building up a reserves stock. In other words, 
we believe that exchange rate intervention should be considered a deliberate policy choice 
regardless of the underlying drivers. 
 
To conclude, in light of the current international context and the recent changes in debt 
composition and policy in developing countries, we anticipate that the fear of appreciation 
analyzed here will be the main contender to the current FIT paradigm among developing 
economies. With this in mind, in this paper we sought to contribute to the ongoing debate on 
exchange rate policy by characterizing this policy and documenting its implications for the real 
economy. The promising results reported here only confirm that the exchange rate debate is still 
alive and in need of a reappraisal.Crucially, we do not claim that fear of appreciation (or, more 
generally, exchange rate policy) should be considered as a development strategies in itself; on the 
contrary, our findings suggest that, unlike the Chinese example, the effects of intervention in other 
developing economies tend to be more modest and short lived. However, by keeping local costs 
depressed, fear of appreciation may give growth and investment a temporary boost, which in turn 
may create the conditions for long-term development provided the productivity dividends of 
investment materialize.  
                                                 
37 We thank an anonymous referee for highlighting this point to us. 
38 See, e.g., Bernanke (2005) and Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti, 2009). 
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Table 1
Dependent Variable: Intervention index
Sample of 1974-2007 Sample of 1993-2007
Variables [1] [2]
Control Variables
∆Log(M2/GDP) 0.116** -0.113
(0.058) (0.092)
∆ (X-M)/GDP 0.427** 0.675***
(0.174) (0.219)
∆Log(ToT) (t) 0.002*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Financial account to GDP (t) 0.003*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.002)
Observations 2512 1379
R-squared 0.184 0.192
Mean  Dep. var. 0.091 0.159
St Dev  Dep. var. 0.383 0.356
Note: 
All regressions included country fixed effects and Time dummies
Robust standard errors in parentheses / * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Int1
(t)
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Table 2
Sample of 1974-2007
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Real Exchange Rate
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
int1. Index (t) 0.047*** 0.065*** 0.070**
(0.014) (0.022) (0.032)
int2. Index (t) 0.116*** 0.218*** 0.236***
(0.034) (0.055) (0.072)
Control Variables
∆Log(ToT) (t) 0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.001 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trading partners growth (t) 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Financial account to GDP (t) -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 2356 2436 1254 1281 841 859
R-squared 0.79 0.798 0.805 0.813 0.814 0.82
Mean  Dep. var. 0.901 0.888 0.895 0.885 0.892 0.885
St Dev  Dep. var. 0.408 0.416 0.404 0.413 0.403 0.409
Note: 
All regressions included country fixed effects and Time dummies
Robust standard errors in parentheses / * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
LRER
(t)
(t)                                                                   
(Two year average)
(t)                                                                   
(Three year average)
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Table 3
Sample of 1974-2007
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Undervaluation
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
int1. Index (t) 0.042*** 0.055** 0.053*
(0.013) (0.022) (0.030)
int2. Index (t) 0.095*** 0.167*** 0.172**
(0.032) (0.055) (0.069)
Control Variables
∆Log(ToT) (t) 0.001 0.001 0.001** 0.001* 0.003*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trading partners growth (t) 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Financial account to GDP (t) -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 2339 2407 1246 1267 834 848
R-squared 0.756 0.761 0.77 0.775 0.786 0.788
Mean  Dep. var. 0.093 0.090 0.085 0.083 0.084 0.085
St Dev  Dep. var. 0.364 0.366 0.362 0.364 0.358 0.356
Note: 
All regressions included country fixed effects and Time dummies
Robust standard errors in parentheses / * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
lnunderval
(t)
(t)                                                                   
(Two year average)
(t)                                                                   
(Three year average)
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Table 4
Sample of 1974-2007
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Change of Consumer Price Index and GDP Deflator
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
int1. Index (t) 0.702 1.178* 0.687** 1.932***
(0.578) (0.711) (0.322) (0.721)
int2. Index (t) 1.100 0.997 1.935** 6.933***
(2.244) (2.183) (0.944) (1.840)
Control Variables
Dep. var. (t-1) 0.156*** 0.175*** 0.124*** 0.123*** -0.003 0.016 -0.064 -0.049
(0.028) (0.031) (0.017) (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.040) (0.034)
∆%GDP (t) -0.089** -0.099** -0.176*** -0.212*** -0.011 -0.033 0.026 0.000
(0.043) (0.040) (0.057) (0.052) (0.029) (0.027) (0.063) (0.061)
∆%M2 (t) 0.137*** 0.170*** 0.239*** 0.314*** -0.013 -0.004 0.001 -0.007
(0.034) (0.024) (0.051) (0.030) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Interest Rate (t) 0.367*** 0.338*** 0.331*** 0.283*** 0.002* 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.032) (0.025) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2026 2105 2250 2322 1971 2038 655 670
R-squared 0.755 0.745 0.686 0.699 0.150 0.150 0.298 0.289
Mean  Dep. var. 8.743 9.033 9.847 9.807 0.264 0.258 0.249 0.248
St Dev  Dep. var. 11.371 11.637 13.061 12.953 4.024 4.074 2.774 2.818
Note: 
All regressions included country fixed effects and Time dummies
Robust standard errors in parentheses / * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
( t ) (3-year average)
∆%Deflator - 
∆%CPI
∆%Deflator - 
∆%CPI
∆%CPI ∆%Deflator
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Table 5
Sample of 1974-2007
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Change of the Real Gross Domestic Product 
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
int1. Index (t) 1.147*** 1.110*** 1.236***
(0.204) (0.299) (0.373)
int1. Index_neg (t) 0.092
(0.575)
int2. Index (t) 2.072*** 1.411** 1.557*
(0.475) (0.684) (0.929)
int2. Index_neg (t) 1.421
(1.308)
Control Variables
Dep. var. (t) 0.298*** 0.298*** 0.300*** 0.300*** 0.018 0.004
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.029) (0.029)
LGDP_HP_cycle (t) -34.375*** -34.378*** -34.995*** -35.079***
(2.447) (2.449) (2.409) (2.416)
∆Log(ToT) (t+1) 0.019** 0.019** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.092*** 0.090***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
Population growth (t+1) 0.261* 0.260* 0.283* 0.281* 0.252 0.315
(0.150) (0.150) (0.154) (0.154) (0.232) (0.230)
Financial account to GDP (t+1) 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.057*** 0.063***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020)
Trading partners growth (t+1) 0.031 0.031 0.046 0.046 0.086 0.082
(0.065) (0.065) (0.068) (0.067) (0.069) (0.067)
LGDP (t) -0.858 -0.856 -0.942* -0.946* -6.467*** -6.576***
(0.537) (0.537) (0.533) (0.532) (0.812) (0.801)
Observations 2307 2307 2384 2384 780 800
R-squared 0.425 0.425 0.426 0.427 0.533 0.523
Mean  Dep. var. 3.939 3.939 3.919 3.919 3.63 3.629
St Dev  Dep. var. 3.981 3.981 3.991 3.991 3.172 3.154
Note: 
All regressions included country fixed effects and Time dummies
Robust standard errors in parentheses / * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
∆%GDP
(t+1) (t+1) (Three year average)
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Table 6
Sample of 1974-2007
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Change of the Real Gross Domestic Product Per Worker
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
int1. Index (t) 1.328*** 1.627*** 0.038***
(0.270) (0.378) (0.015)
int1. Index_neg (t) -0.731
(0.772)
int2. Index (t) 1.503** 2.041** 0.063*
(0.656) (0.925) (0.035)
int2. Index_neg (t) -1.144
(1.859)
Control Variables
Dep. var. (t) 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.104*** 0.105***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.040) (0.040)
LGDP_HP_cycle (t) -18.694*** -18.717*** -18.963*** -18.932***
(3.128) (3.121) (3.111) (3.114)
∆Log(ToT) (t+1) 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 0.000 0.000
Population growth (t+1) -0.147 -0.143 -0.137 -0.135 0.003 0.005
(0.203) (0.203) (0.212) (0.212) (0.004) (0.004)
Financial account to GDP (t+1) 0.030 0.031* 0.042** 0.043** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.001) (0.001)
Trading partners growth (t+1) 0.127** 0.127** 0.128** 0.128** -0.005 -0.005
(0.055) (0.055) (0.052) (0.053) (0.004) (0.004)
LGDPpw (t) -2.148*** -2.154*** -2.242*** -2.230*** -0.152*** -0.152***
(0.613) (0.613) (0.618) (0.615) (0.022) (0.023)
Observations 2257 2257 2332 2332 710 726
R-squared 0.304 0.304 0.301 0.301 0.536 0.529
Mean  Dep. var. 1.415 1.415 1.367 1.367 0.031 0.03
St Dev  Dep. var. 4.929 4.929 4.967 4.967 0.098 0.098
Note: 
All regressions included country fixed effects and Time dummies
Robust standard errors in parentheses / * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(t+1) (t+1) (Three year average)
∆%GDPpw 
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Table 7
Sample of 1974-2007
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Change of the Real Gross Domestic Product
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
int1. Index (t) 0.757*** 0.364*** 0.473*** 0.906***
(0.150) (0.092) (0.151) (0.188)
int1. Index (t-1) 0.586*** 0.369***
(0.140) (0.090)
int1. Index (t-2) 0.619*** 0.379***
(0.147) (0.087)
int1. Index (t-3) 0.262* 0.338***
(0.140) (0.090)
int2. Index (t) 1.623*** 0.786*** 1.012*** 2.041***
(0.304) (0.193) (0.347) (0.462)
int2. Index (t-1) 1.462*** 0.938***
(0.298) (0.204)
int2. Index (t-2) 1.085*** 0.791***
(0.298) (0.185)
int2. Index (t-3) 0.434 0.661***
(0.288) (0.184)
Control Variables
LGDP_BK_trend (t) -4.318*** -4.487***
(0.453) (0.435)
LGDP_HP_trend (t) -3.352*** -3.561***
(0.295) (0.285)
LGDP_BK_cycle (t) -60.051*** -60.425***
(2.887) (2.829)
LGDP_HP_cycle (t) -26.699*** -27.353***
(1.755) (1.787)
∆Log(ToT) (t+1) 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.01 0.01 0.013* 0.015**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Population growth (t+1) 0.618*** 0.610*** 0.349*** 0.324*** -0.18 -0.16 -0.03 0.01
(0.142) (0.143) (0.078) (0.078) (0.139) (0.143) (0.123) (0.125)
Financial account to GDP (t+1) 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.034*** 0.036*** 0.01 0.01 0.027** 0.029**
(0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013)
Trading partners growth (t+1) 0.039 0.048 0.021 0.022 -0.015 -0.008 0.009 0.019
(0.035) (0.035) (0.024) (0.023) (0.033) (0.033) (0.054) (0.055)
Observations 1916 2034 2010 2127 2188 2260 2308 2384
R-squared 0.537 0.540 0.664 0.672 0.363 0.368 0.261 0.259
Mean  Dep. var. 3.510 3.506 3.540 3.537 0.184 0.174 0.321 0.298
St Dev  Dep. var. 2.055 2.039 2.063 2.048 2.681 2.673 3.225 3.226
Note: 
All regressions included country fixed effects and Time dummies
Robust standard errors in parentheses / * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
trend (% change) cycle (% change)
(t+1) (t+1)
BK HP BK HP
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Table 8
Sample of 1974-2007
Dependent Variable:  Percentage of Change of Real Exports and Imports, and Herfindahl Index of Exports
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
int1. Index (t) 4.310*** 3.768*** 2.627* -1.660* 0.264 -1.757 0.009
(1.010) (1.454) (1.505) (0.977) (1.131) (1.129) (0.014)
int2. Index (t) 5.918** 8.832*** -1.535 -0.775 3.027 1.312 0.028
(2.669) (3.266) (4.352) (2.293) (2.859) (3.096) (0.037)
Control Variables
Dep. var. (t) -0.103*** -0.092*** -0.128*** -0.117*** -0.101*** -0.088** -0.080*** -0.087*** -0.069* -0.048 -0.061 -0.056 0.334*** 0.320***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.027) (0.027) (0.038) (0.041) (0.039) (0.041) (0.099) (0.094)
∆%GDP (t+1) 1.171*** 1.226*** 1.111*** 1.145*** 1.118*** 1.173*** 0.472*** 0.453*** 0.382** 0.389*** 0.342** 0.332** 0.001 0.002
(0.122) (0.121) (0.184) (0.181) (0.170) (0.179) (0.107) (0.099) (0.148) (0.145) (0.146) (0.144) (0.002) (0.002)
∆Log(ToT) (t+1) 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.179*** 0.189*** 0.186*** 0.201*** 0.156*** 0.157*** 0.185*** 0.184*** 0.224*** 0.197*** 0.001* 0.001**
(0.023) (0.016) (0.060) (0.059) (0.062) (0.062) (0.038) (0.033) (0.052) (0.050) (0.054) (0.052) (0.001) (0.001)
Population growth (t+1) -0.832 -0.879 -1.742** -1.891*** -1.692** -1.716** 0.598 0.546 0.063 0.008 0.248 0.210 -0.014 -0.015
(0.684) (0.689) (0.721) (0.715) (0.742) (0.763) (0.475) (0.479) (0.860) (0.852) (0.882) (0.860) (0.012) (0.012)
Financial account to GDP (t+1) 0.142** 0.126** 0.098 0.101 0.101 0.124* 0.073 0.094 0.078 0.043 0.087 0.045 -0.001 -0.001
(0.064) (0.063) (0.079) (0.077) (0.077) (0.075) (0.061) (0.064) (0.072) (0.074) (0.071) (0.073) (0.001) (0.001)
Trading partners growth (t+1) 0.946*** 0.716* 0.826* 0.795* 0.786* 0.860* 0.306 0.235 0.145 0.222 0.027 0.199 -0.011** -0.011**
(0.332) (0.376) (0.473) (0.464) (0.458) (0.467) (0.352) (0.334) (0.441) (0.431) (0.446) (0.443) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 1389 1434 451 460 454 464 1490 1561 480 496 485 499 380 391
R-squared 0.293 0.279 0.468 0.482 0.472 0.47 0.211 0.210 0.398 0.392 0.402 0.391 0.861 0.855
Mean  Dep. var. 5.412 5.698 5.533 5.659 5.720 5.727 5.434 5.397 5.649 5.696 5.760 5.762 0.170 0.173
St Dev  Dep. var. 13.247 13.201 8.434 8.428 8.418 8.481 13.079 12.905 6.941 6.933 7.001 6.971 0.149 0.149
Note: 
All regressions included country fixed effects and Time dummies
Robust standard errors in parentheses / * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
∆%Export 
Herfindahl
 ∆%Export
VolumeVolume
∆%Import
Index
(t+1)                                  
(3-year average)
(t+1) (t+1)
(t+1)                                  
(3-year average)
(t)
(t+1)                                  
(3-year average)
(t)
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Table 9
Sample of 1974-2007
Dependent Variable: Nominal Gross Domestic Savings and Real Gross Capital Formation as a share of GDP
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
int1. Index (t) 1.243*** 1.438*** 1.235***
(0.374) (0.218) (0.213)
int2. Index (t) 1.945** 2.394*** 2.109***
(0.927) (0.570) (0.559)
Control Variables
Dep. var. (t) 0.638*** 0.631*** 0.596*** 0.592***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Saving nominal/GDP (t+1) 0.138*** 0.140***
(0.018) (0.017)
∆%GDP (t) 0.148*** 0.146*** 0.097*** 0.099*** 0.083*** 0.086***
(0.037) (0.035) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
∆Log(ToT) (t+1) 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.001 0.001 -0.008 -0.007
(0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Population growth (t+1) 0.331 0.273 0.175 0.220 0.115 0.164
(0.225) (0.227) (0.164) (0.167) (0.154) (0.158)
Financial account to GDP (t+1) -0.122*** -0.150*** 0.112*** 0.114*** 0.152*** 0.152***
(0.035) (0.027) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020)
Trading partners growth (t+1) 0.078 0.050 0.044 0.036 0.031 0.025
(0.052) (0.052) (0.056) (0.054) (0.057) (0.056)
Observations 2272 2353 2065 2146 2065 2146
R-squared 0.784 0.781 0.826 0.818 0.836 0.828
Mean  Dep. var. 15.84 16.11 21.99 22.13 21.99 22.13
St Dev  Dep. var. 11.71 11.52 7.27 7.28 7.27 7.28
Note: 
All regressions included country fixed effects and Time dummies
Robust standard errors in parentheses / * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Real Gross Capital Formation as % GDP
Nominal Gross Domestic 
Savings as % GDP
(t+1) (t+1)
 
 
 37 
Table 10
Sample of 1974-2007
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Retribution to Labor to Capital Compensation , (wL/rK)
Variables [1] [2]
int1. Index (t) -5.613***
(1.998)
int1. Index ( t-1, t-3) -0.980
(3.429)
int2. Index (t) -23.867***
(7.519)
int2. Index ( t-1, t-3) -19.578**
(9.429)
Control Variables
∆Log(ToT) (t) -0.036 -0.044
(0.070) (0.063)
Population growth (t) 3.065 2.847
(3.388) (3.456)
Financial account to GDP (t) 0.262* 0.304**
(0.142) (0.144)
Trading partners growth (t) -1.510 -1.306
(0.959) (0.920)
∆%GDPpw (t) -0.010 -0.028
(0.207) (0.190)
Observations 579 596
R-squared 0.885 0.886
Mean  Dep. var. 95.11 94.72
St Dev  Dep. var. 47.38 46.94
Note: 
All regressions included country fixed effects and Time dummies
Robust standard errors in parentheses / * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
( t )
Retribution to Labor as % Capital 
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Table 11
Sample of 1974-2007
Dependent Variable: Unemployment Rate
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
int1. Index (t) -0.672*** -0.648***
(0.170) (0.162)
int1. Index (t-1) 0.236 0.221
(0.217) (0.202)
int2. Index (t) -1.473*** -1.425**
(0.533) (0.562)
int2. Index (t-1) 0.533 0.535
(0.509) (0.491)
Control Variables
Dep. var. (t) 0.684*** 0.686*** 0.670*** 0.675***
(0.058) (0.054) (0.053) (0.049)
∆Log(ToT) (t+1) -0.001 0.000
(0.007) (0.007)
Population growth (t+1) -0.303 -0.272
(0.213) (0.210)
Financial account to GDP (t+1) -0.017 -0.02
(0.012) (0.015)
Trading partners growth (t+1) -0.116 -0.183**
(0.080) (0.080)
∆%GDP (t) -0.066*** -0.066***
(0.016) (0.016)
Observations 731 799 799 867
R-squared 0.893 0.900 0.887 0.893
Mean  Dep. var. 8.894 9.209 8.932 9.219
St Dev  Dep. var. 4.471 4.638 4.429 4.587
Note: 
All regressions included country fixed effects and Time dummies
Robust standard errors in parentheses / * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(t+1)
Unemployment Rate (in %)
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